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ABSTRACT 
In this paper the views of a sample of 74 Greek Members of Parliament 
(MPs) on European integration and the handling of the economic crisis 
by the EU are discussed and interpreted. The survey of MPs, which was 
conducted in 2014, is a replication of a comparable study conducted in 
2007. Greek MPs continue to be attached to Europe, but evaluate 
negatively EU’s institutions’ role during the economic crisis. Overall, 
three groups of parliamentarians, namely pro-government MPs, 
parliamentarians self-placed at the centre of the left-right spectrum and 
more experienced MPs, tended to have more pro-European views and 
attitudes than MPs of the opposition, left-wing MPs and less 
experienced MPs. The dominant dimension of conflict for Greek political 
elites is the issue of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). The 
SYRIZA-ANEL government that was formed after the January 2015 
elections was not a surprise given the close proximity of these two 
parties on their stance towards the MoUs and the EU.   
 
Keywords: Political elites, European integration, identity, 
representation, governance 
                                                 
# Lecturer/Department of Political Science and Public Administration/University of Athens 





  1 
What Greek political elites think about 
Europe and the crisis? An exploratory analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 2010, the fiscal and financial crisis in Europe has increased the 
perceived importance of the European Union (EU) and, at the same time, 
the questioning of its effectiveness and scope. In the period up to the 
elections of May 2014 for the European Parliament (EP), as the crisis in 
the Eurozone evolved, parliamentary elites continued to play the role of 
mediators between EU institutions and citizens. That role became 
particularly sensitive and vulnerable when economic adjustment 
programs were formulated and agreed between the EU and Member-
States, as it happened in Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
In order to address the afore-mentioned questions, an international 
research project was devised by J. Real-Nato (University of Almeria, 
Spain), under the title European National Elites and the Crisis (ENEC).  The 
research project examines the attitudes of Members of National 
Parliaments (MPs) in ten EU Member-States (Croatia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Lithuania, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) and partly 
serves as a replication of the ‘InTune’ project.  
‘InTune’ (standing for ‘Integrated and United’) was a research project on 
European and national identity, representation, and the scope of 
governance, which involved surveys of elites and mass publics in 16 EU 
Member-States and two candidate Member-States, on the basis of a 
common standardized questionnaire. The ‘InTune’ survey of 2007 for 
Greece is used in this paper in order to register changes across time. The 
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results of the ENEC survey for the rest of EU countries will be presented 
by other researchers in the annual conference of the Council of European 
Studies (CES) in July 2015 in Paris. 
The crisis in Greece 
Since 2010 fierce political debates have taken place on whether the 
blame for the crisis should be put on Greece or the EU and whether the 
measures provided by Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were 
appropriate or even necessary. A major erosion of social trust and a great 
delegitimation of the political system as a whole preceded the crisis and 
paved the way for the dealignment of the Greek political and party 
system (Verney, 2014, p. 20). The twin ‘earthquake’ elections of May and 
June 2012 (Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos, 2014) saw the rise of SYRIZA, a 
party of the radical left, to the status of the main opposition party in the 
Greek parliament.  
Interviews with Greek MPs for this project took place in 2014, i.e. within 
the term of the previous Greek parliament (2012-2014). In the midst of 
conducting field research for this project, elections for the European 
Parliament (EP) took place (May 2014). In these elections SYRIZA was a 
clear winner with 27 per cent of the vote. ND came second with 23 per 
cent and Golden Dawn came third with 9 per cent. PASOK, which had 
obtained 12 per cent of the vote in the June 2012 elections, formed a 
center-left umbrella electoral ticket, declined even further and came 
fourth with 8 per cent. As it was expected, the electoral campaign for the 
EP elections was dominated by the issue of Greece’s overcoming the 
crisis and whether European Union’s policies had been appropriate or 
not.  
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2.  Research Questions 
Our main research question is the following: in what ways have the 
experience of the economic crisis and the debates noted above affected 
what Greek political elites think of the EU?  More specifically we seek to 
explore: 1) How has the Eurozone crisis affected the attitudes of political 
elites towards the EU? 2) How political elites evaluate the role played by 
EU institutions in the management of the crisis? 3) How do they perceive 
the future of European integration?  4) Which factors explain the 
configuration of political elites’ attitudes towards the EU? And 5) were 
there in the previous parliament any signs of the seemingly ‘obscure’ 
coalition Government that came of the January 2015 elections? 
 
3. Theoretical background and brief review of the literature 
Since the late 1990’s European issues have been integrated into domestic 
political agendas (Hooghe and Marks 1999). National elites had been 
supportive of the European integration process, serving both as its driving 
agents and local legitimating intermediaries (Haller 2008). Many studies 
have tried to explain the general support for EU integration among 
national elites and how the elites influence and shape national public 
opinion (Katz and Wessels 1999; Ray 1999; Marks et al. 2002, Johansson 
2002). Studying elites does not mean that with regard to the project of 
European integration elites matter while masses do not. In an elite-driven 
project, such as the project of European integration, the attitudes and 
expectations of citizens count by placing limits on the discretion which 
political elites enjoy in formulating national and EU policies.  
  4 
In the context of inter-governmentalism, EU Member-States are treated 
as equal and their governing elites play multiple roles, now pursuing 
national interests, then furthering the integration of nation-states of the 
EU (Milward 1992, Haller 2008, Scharpf 2009).  
Study results regarding the relationship between elites and the public 
point towards two directions. On the one hand there is evidence 
supporting the argument that elites shape citizens’ opinions (Gabel and 
Scheve 2007, Ray 2003), often depending on the degree of consensus 
among elite members (Hooghe and Marks 2005). On the other hand, 
other studies suggest that public opinion also influences elites’ opinions, 
mainly through elections (Carrubba 2001).  
The InTune project (noted in section 1 above) has challenged the notion 
of a coherent European elite (Ilonzki 2010, Conti et al. 2011, Best 2012). 
Identity, representation and scope of governance were not subjects dealt 
with by elites in a common way.  
Explaining differences in elite attitudes towards European integration  
Past research has shown that the stance of political elites and parties may 
vary along other dimensions. Some relevant hypotheses have emerged. 
First, according to Sitter (2001), there is a distinction between 
government and opposition. Incumbent parties will tend to be more 
supportive of European integration than opposition parties and in fact a 
party’s stand may change when it shifts from being in the opposition to 
assuming government responsibilities.  Second, according to Szczerbiak 
and Taggart (2000), parties positioned on the margins of a country’s party 
system will tend to be anti-integration, while parties closer to the centre 
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of the party system will tend to favour European integration. And, third, 
the position of a party along the left-right scale matters (Hooghe et al. 
2004) but is not permanently fixed. The left emphasizes international 
cooperation more than the right which underlines national state 
authority (Budge et al. 2001). However, the socialist left has moved from 
an anti-EU to a pro-EU stand, as the case of the Greek socialist party 
(PASOK) shows (Verney 1996). Other left parties, e.g., the communists, 
have retained a Eurosceptic or even strong anti-EU stand. 
The shifting views of political parties and elites regarding Greece in the EU 
Results of past research on Greece have shown that the notion of 
national and European identity for Greek political elites was underlined 
by the factors of ‘traditionalism’ and ‘liberalism’ (Nezi, Sotiropoulos & 
Toka, 2010, p. 87-88). The modernisers or liberals wanted to accelerate 
domestic reforms through Europeanisation. Traditionalists understood 
the EU as a threat challenging the country’s traditional cultural identity. A 
dimension with similar characteristics to ‘traditionalism’ was also found 
in 2012 in a context where the ideological dimensions of party 
competition were examined (see Freire, Tsatsanis & Tsirbas, 2014).  
In terms of representation, measured as the amount of trust in certain 
European institutions, Greek parliamentarians trusted the European 
Parliament (EP) the most and, in general, showed more trust than the 
public towards the EP (Nezi, Sotiropoulos & Toka, 2010, p. 89). At the 
same time, in 2007 MPs were more supportive of transferring 
responsibilities of decision making to the European level, than the public 
opinion (Nezi, Sotiropoulos & Toka, 2010, p. 90). Self-placement on the 
left-right scale was the best predictor of MPs opinions, with MPs on the 
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left being less pro-European and more skeptical about the process of 
European integration than those on the centre and on the right (Nezi, 
Sotiropoulos & Toka, 2010, p. 94). However, a study of Greek 
parliamentary representatives conducted in July 2013 highlighted the 
importance of other issue dimensions as well, except from the traditional 
left-right dimension (Karyotis, Rudig & Judge, 2014).  
Hypotheses 
Although the scope of the present paper is rather descriptive and 
exploratory, we believe that four general hypotheses could be 
formulated in relation to our research questions and the above 
theoretical review: 1) Greek parliamentarians in general are expected to 
be less favourable towards the EU and the process of the European 
integration in comparison to 2007 because of crisis-related 
developments. 2) Greek MPs attitudes towards the handling of the crisis 
by EU institutions are naturally expected to differ according to MPs party 
affiliation, i.e. MPs of parties which supported and implemented EU’s 
solutions will be more favourable than MPs of parties which opposed 
these solutions. Moreover, as we move towards the Left end of the 
political spectrum stances towards the EU should be less favourable, as 
will be the case with less experienced MPs. 3) Since coalition formation 
requires a certain degree of proximity, there should be, in the parliament 
under investigation, a traceable rapprochement between SYRIZA and 
ANEL, the government partners after the January 2015 election.  
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4. Methodology and data collection  
Our project is based on structured and detailed interviews, based on a 
questionnaire devised in collaboration with researchers from another 
nine EU Member-States who participate in this comparative study 
(comparative data from other countries is not yet available). A total of 74 
Greek MPs were interviewed in Athens between February and October 
2014. In order for the final sample to be representative of the national 
assembly, quota sampling was applied, in terms of party, gender and 
whether the MP was a newcomer or not. As shown in Tables 1, 2 & 3 the 
sample is quite satisfactory in terms of representativeness, which is the 
reason why weighting was deemed unnecessary. The only exception is 
the Greek Communist Party (KKE) which did not issue a permission to its 
MPs to participate in this study either on 2007 or in 2014.  
Table 1: Respondents’ Party  
 Sample (%) Greek Parliament (%) 
October 2014 ND 43.2 42.3 
SYRIZA 25.7 23.7 
PASOK 10.8 9.3 
ANEL 4.1 4.3 
GD 6.8 5.3 
DIMAR 5.4 3.3 
KKE 0.0 4.0 
Independent MPs 4.1 7.7 
Note: ND = New Democracy, SYRIZA = Coalition of the Radical Left, PASOK = Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement, ANEL = Independent Greeks, GD = Golden Dawn, DIMAR = Democratic 
Left, KKE = Communist Party of Greece. 
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Table 2: Newcomers* 
 Sample (%) Greek Parliament (%) 
October 2014 Newcomers 55.4 49.7 
Not newcomers 44.6 50.3 
*MPs who were elected for the first time either in May or June 2012 general election. 
Table 3: Respondents’ Gender  
 Sample (%) Greek Parliament (%) 
October 2014 Men 78.4 79 
Women 21.6 21 
 
Altogether 69 interviews were conducted face-to-face and five interviews 
were conducted via telephone. Interviews lasted 29 minutes on average. 
The overall response rate of the study was 30 per cent, i.e. 249 MPs were 
contacted in total in order to obtain the 74 interviews. The sampling error 
for this sample size is in the area of ±9%. 
Answers to the questions were inserted in the questionnaire as multiple-
choice answers or items on a Likert scale. In order to identify causal 
relations, we employed principal components analysis (PCA), discriminant 
analysis and binary logistic regression. As shown in section 5 below, PCA 
serves in finding latent variables that differentiate MPs’ views. The 
components revealed from PCA serve then as independent variables in 
discriminant analysis, which has the advantage of plotting party 
affiliations across dimensions. On the other hand, the predictive power of 
the same factors is tested through logistic regression, where they are 
used as predictors of MPs being in government or opposition.  
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Finally, our main explanatory variables are party affiliation and ideological 
self-placement on the Left-Right scale. Although the fact that the 
variables ‘newcomers vs. not newcomers’ and MPs’ ‘governmental 
experience vs. no governmental experience’ seem to differentiate the 
views of MPs, it has to be born in mind that both variables are inter-
correlated with certain parties’ MPs. This is so because the vast majority 
of SYRIZA’s, ANEL’s and GD’s MPs are newcomers and the MPs with 




5.1 Respondents’ profile 
Additional information about the MPs who participated in the study 
shows that their mean age is 52 years old and their average tenure in 
parliament is 5.4 years (data not shown). Also, 23 per cent of the 
interviewees have been members of the cabinet, i.e. government 
ministers (Table 5). Concerning their ideological self-placement, the mean 
score on the left-right axis is 4.85 (Table 4).  
Table 4: Respondents’ Left-right axis self-placement  
 % Mean Score 
0 (Left) 7.0  
1 9.9  
2 9.9  
3 7.0  
4 11.3 4.85 
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5 7.0  
6 12.7  
7 12.7  
8 15.5  
9 5.6  
10 (Right) 1.4  
Table 5: Respondents’ Governmental Experience 
 Sample (%) 
Have served as ministers  23.0  
Have not served as ministers  77.0  
 
 
5.2 Attitudes of Greek MPs towards the EU 
 
5.2.1 Attachment to different levels of community 
We have explored attachment to three levels of political community, i.e. 
regional, national and supranational. In 2014 Greek parliamentarians 
were more attached to all levels of community than in 2007. Of course, 
differences in the cases of attachment to region and country are small 
and could be attributed to chance, since percentages reach or exceed 90 
per cent. In the case of Europe however, there is a significant increase: 3 
out of 4 Greek MPs (77 per cent) say that they are “very” or “somewhat” 
attached to Europe, a figure that was 50 per cent in 2007 (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Attachment to different levels of community. Percentage distribution of 
responses (Very/somewhat attached).  
 2007* 2014 
Attachment to region 86.5 98.6 
Attachment to Greece 93.6 100 
Attachment to Europe 50 77 
* InTune project. 
Compared to MPs of ND and PASOK, SYRIZA’s MPs are much less attached 
to Europe (73.7 per cent). PASOK’s MPs are the most attached (100 per 
cent, see Table 7). These differences are statistically significant as χ2 test 
indicates [χ2 (6, N = 74) = 25.866, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V= 0.591]. 
 
Table 7: Attachment to Europe, percentage distribution of responses by party*.  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Very/somewhat 
attached 
77 87.5 73.7 100 33.3 0 100 66.7 
*Since Independent Greeks, Golden Dawn, Democratic Left and Independent MPs 
have small Ns, hereafter results for these parties are considered indicative. 
Similarly, as we move from the left towards the right end of the scale, 
attachment to Europe increases (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Attachment to Europe. Percentage distribution of responses by self-
placement on the L-R scale*. 
 Total Left Centre Right No answer 
Very/somewhat attached 77 75 81.8 80 33.3 
*Note for tables hereafter: Left comprises points 0-3 of the L-R scale, Centre 4-6 and Right 7-
10. 
Since EU is increasingly becoming a major player in the process of 
everyday decision-making and legislating in national parliaments, it is 
only logical that parliamentarians with more experience are more 
attached to Europe (87.9 per cent) than newcomers into parliament (68.3 
per cent). This is depicted in Table 9, in a statistically significant 
relationship [χ2 (1, N = 74) = 3.964, p = 0.046, Cramer’s V= 0.231]. 
Table 9: Attachment to different levels of community. Percentage distribution of 
responses by parliamentary experience.  
 Total Newcomers Not newcomers 
Very/somewhat attached 77 68.3 87.9 
 
5.2.2 Trust in European institutions 
The trust of MPs in European institutions has declined since 2007. This is 
especially the case with European Commission (EC), with the mean score 
being 4.6 in 2014 down from 6.0 in 2007. The EP on the other hand, 
remains the most trusted institution amongst Greek parliamentarians, 
with the mean score being 6.7 in 2014 down from 7.1 in 2007 (Table 10).  
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Table 10: Greek MPs: Level of trust in European Institutions (mean scores), 2007-
2014 
 Political Elites 2007* Political Elites 2014 
Trust in The European Parliament 7.1 6.7 
Trust in the European Commission 6.0 4.6 
Note for tables hereafter: Trust is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates no trust. 
* InTune project. 
When considering breakdowns by party (Table 11), ND’s and PASOK’s 
MPs show the most trust in European institutions, while SYRIZA is at the 
opposite end, especially regarding the EC. The EP is traditionally the most 
trusted institution amongst national parliamentarians. One-way ANOVAs 
were conducted and the party differences are statistically significant for 
both institutions under investigation: European parliament [F(6, 
67)=7.722, p=0.000)], European Commission [F(6, 67)=22.199, p=0.000)]. 
Table 11: Greek MPs: Level of trust in European Institutions. Mean scores by party. 
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Trust in The 
European 
Parliament 
6.7 7.7 5.3 7.1 7.7 3.8 8.3 6 
Trust in the 
European 
Commission 
4.6 6.6 2 5.1 3.7 2.4 5.3 2.7 
As we move from left to right, trust in European institutions increases. 
The corresponding results, which are depicted in table 12, are statistically 
significant for every institution under study: European Parliament [F(3, 
70)=7.141, p=0.000)], European Commission [F(3, 70)=20.055, p=0.000)]. 
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Table 12: Greek MPs: Level of trust in European Institutions (mean scores) by self-
placement on the L-R scale*.  
 Total Left Centre Right No answer 
Trust in the 
European 
Parliament 
6.7 5.9 6.8 7.8 3.7 
Trust in the 
European 
Commission 
4.6 2.6 5.1 6.5 2.3 
 
Consequently, the relationship between ideological self-placement and 
trust in the various European institutions is confirmed, as previous 
research suggests (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2009). Moreover, the 
aforementioned massive renewal (50 per cent) of political personnel that 
occurred in the Greek parliament after the twin ‘earthquake elections’ of 
2012 (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos 2014), has resulted in significant 
differences between ‘newcomers’ and older parliamentarians, with the 
former showing much less trust, especially towards the EC (4 instead of 
5.4 for older parliamentarians) (Table 13). The differences for European 
Commission [F(1, 72)=6.418, p=0.013)] are statistically significant. 
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Table 13: Greek MPs: Level of trust in European Institutions (mean scores) by 
parliamentary experience  
 TOTAL Newcomers Not newcomers 
Trust in the European 
Parliament 
6.7 6.4 7.1 
Trust in the European 
Commission 
4.6 4 5.4 
 
5.2.3 Representation of Greece’s interests 
The percentage of Greek MPs who agree that “Greece’s interests are not 
taken into account by those making decisions at the EU level” is 83.6 per 
cent. In 2007 only 24.7 per of respondents agreed with that statement, 
while the absolute majority (56.2 per cent) of Greek MPs disagreed with 
it (Table 14).  
Table 14: “Greece’s interests are not taken into account by those making decisions 
at the EU level”, 2007-2014.  Percentage distribution of responses.  
 Political Elites 2007* Political Elites 2014 
Strongly/somewhat agree 24.7 83.6 
Neither agree or disagree 19.1 0 
Somewhat/strongly disagree 56.2 16.4 
*Data from InTune project 
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It is therefore apparent that Greek MPs in general are not satisfied today 
with the way that the interests of Greece are represented at the EU level. 
This notion is further supported by the fact that, with regard to responses 
to this question, there are no statistically significant differences in terms 
of party, ideological self-placement or parliamentary experience (years of 
serving as MP). In all the relevant indices for which comparison with 2007 
is available, stances towards the EU are less positive, thus vindicating our 
first hypothesis. 
5.2.4 Democracy in the EU 
As indicated in Table 15, satisfaction with the way democracy functions in 
the EU is rather low both in terms of public opinion and the opinion of 
political elites. Eurobarometer data (Table 15) shows that the situation in 
terms of the European public opinion is somewhat more optimistic, with 
‘very’ and ‘fairly’ satisfied summing to 44 per cent, as opposed to 25 per 
cent for Greek public opinion and 36.5 per cent for Greek 
parliamentarians. 
Table 15: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU. Percentage 
distribution of responses.  







Very Satisfied 4 2 2.7 
Fairly satisfied 40 23 33.8 
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Not very satisfied 32 37 43.2 
Not at all satisfied 11 33 20.3 
DK 13 5 0 
*Data from Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014. 
Once more, PASOK’s and ND’s MPs are those more satisfied with the way 
democracy works in the EU, while SYRIZA’s MPs indicate no satisfaction 
at all, followed by other opposition parties, with the exception of 
Democratic Left (DIMAR), the MPs of which are split in half (Table 16). 
These differences are statistically significant [χ2 (6, N = 74)=21.283, p = 
0.002, Cramer’s V=0.536]. 
Table 16 Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU by party. Percentage 
distribution of responses.  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Very/Fairly 
satisfied 
36.5 56.3 0 62.5 33.3 20 50 0 
Not very/Not 
at all satisfied 
63.5 43.8 100 37.5 66.7 80 50 100 
 
Again ideological self-placement of MPs serves as a predictor of the views 
of MPs, as shown in Table 17. Satisfaction with the way democracy works 
in the EU increases as we move towards the right, where it reaches 68 
per cent. On the other hand, only 12.5 per cent of left-wing MPs are 
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satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU. The differences 
between different categories of ideological self-placement are also 
statistically significant [χ2 (3, N = 74) = 17.491, p = 0.001, Cramer’s 
V=0.486]. 
Table 17 Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU by self-placement on 
the L-R scale*. Percentage distribution of responses.  
 Total Left Centre Right No answer 
Very/Fairly satisfied 36.5 12.5 27.3 68 33.3 
Not very/Not at all 
satisfied 
63.5 87.5 72.7 32 66.7 
 
5.2.5 The EU as a threat to Greece 
The absolute majority (51.4 per cent) of Greek MPs believe that the EU 
endangers economic growth in Greece. Among our respondents, 32.4 per 
cent share the same view about the achievements of the Greek welfare 
system, 28.4 per cent about the quality of democracy and 16.2 per cent 
believe that the EU endangers the Greek culture (Figure 1). 
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Figure : The EU as a threat to Greece’s economic growth, welfare system, 
democracy and culture. Percentage distribution of responses. 
 
Opposition parties’ MPs agree the most with the view that the EU 
endangers the economic growth of Greece, while PASOK’s and ND’s MPs 
disagree (Table 18), in a statistically significant relationship [χ2 (6, N = 74) 
= 43.188, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V= 0.764]. 
Table 18 The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, by party. Percentage 
distribution of responses.  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Strongly/Somewhat 
Agree 
51.4 18.8 94.7 12.5 100 100 50.0 100 
Somewhat/Strongly 
Disagree  
48.6 81.3 5.3 87.5 - - 50.0 - 
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Figure 2 The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, by L-R self-placement 
(%)
 
As shown in Figure 2, agreement with the above view is also 
differentiated, according to left-right self-placement. In a statistically 
significant relationship (χ2 (3, N = 74) = 21.115, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V= 
0.534), agreement with this view diminishes as we move from left (83.3 
per cent) to right (24.0 per cent) on the L-R scale.  
Similarly, there are statistically significant relationships between on the 
one hand agreement with the view that the EU endangers economic 
growth in Greece and, on the other hand,  parliamentary experience (([χ2 
(1, N = 74) = 13.845, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V= 0.433])) and governmental 
experience (([χ2 (1, N = 74) = 5.356, p = 0.021, Cramer’s V= 0.269]), with 
those being more experienced agreeing less with the above view than 
those not being experienced (Figures 3 & 4). 
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Figure 3: The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, by governmental 
experience. Strongly/Somewhat agree (%) 
 
Figure 4: The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, by parliamentary 
experience. Strongly/Somewhat agree (%) 
 
 
5.3. Evaluation of EU institutions’ role during the crisis 
The MPs’ evaluation of EU institutions which were mostly involved in the 
handling of the crisis, i.e., the  European Commission, the European 
Council and the European Central Bank, is overall negative (Table 19). 
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Table 19: Evaluation of European institutions’ role during the crisis. Mean scores. 
 Mean Scores 
European Commission 4.1 
European Council 4.5 
European Central Bank 4.1 
Note for tables hereafter: Evaluation is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates an 
absolutely negative evaluation. 
As expected in our second hypothesis, MPs of governing parties which 
had signed the bail-out agreements of 2010 and 2012 and implemented 
the relevant policies evaluate more positively the EU institutions involved 
in the handling of the crisis. The opposite holds for MPs of opposition 
parties (Table 22). As one-way ANOVA analysis indicates, this is a 
statistically significant relationship, for the European Commission [F(6, 
67)=13.389, p=0.000)], the European Council [F(6, 67)=12.919, p=0.000)] 
and the European Central Bank [F(6, 67)=33.293, p=0.000)]. 
At the same time, self-placement on the left-right axis also differentiates 
the MPs’ evaluations of EU institutions. More concretely, MPs on the left 
give the most negative evaluations, while those on the right the most 
positive, in statistically significant relationships (Table 21): European 
Commission [F(3, 70)=19.062, p=0.000)], European Council [F(3, 
70)=17.377, p=0.000)] and European Central Bank [F(3, 70)=18.746, 
p=0.000)]. 
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Table 20: Evaluation of European institutions’ role during the crisis. Mean scores by 
party. 
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
European 
Commission 
4.1 5.8 1.4 4.9 3.7 2.6 4 3.7 
European 
Council 
4.5 6.3 1.7 5.5 4 3 4 3.7 
European 
Central Bank 
4.1 6.4 0.8 5.9 2.7 0.8 4 3.7 
Table 21: Evaluation of European institutions’ role during the crisis. Mean scores by 
self-placement on the L-R scale*. 
 Total Left Centre Right No answer 
European 
Commission 
4.1 2 4.5 5.9 2 
European Council 4.5 2.3 4.8 6.4 3 
European Central 
Bank 
4.1 1.6 4.8 6.2 2.3 
 
However, in an overall evaluation of whether Greece has benefited or not 
from being a member of the EU, more than three quarters (77 per cent) 
of Greek MPs are positive. Only 17.6 per cent of Greek MPs think that 
Greece has not benefited from Greece’s membership in the EU (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Greece has on 
balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?”  
(%) 
  
SYRIZA’s MPs are divided on this issue: one half believe that Greece has 
benefited from EU membership, whereas the other half rejects this view. 
By contrast, MPs of PASOK and ND agree the most with the view that EU 
membership has been beneficiary for Greece, with 100 and 96.9 per cent 
respectively (not shown in a table) .  
Respondents were asked to rank some potential alternative solutions to 
the crisis (not shown in a table) and the choice that received the highest 
percentage as first choice was “an intervention of the EU”, with 37.7 per 
cent, while the second one was “a coordinated action of national 
governments”, with 32.9 per cent.  
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5.4 The future of European Integration 
 
5.4.1 The process of European unification 
The absolute majority of MPs in our sample is supportive of the process 
of furthering the unification of the EU. More specifically, 54 per cent of 
the respondents are positioned on the three most extreme points of the 
eleven-point scale, being in favour of having a more unified EU. The mean 
score of our sample on the same scale is 7. 
Table 22: “Has European unification gone too far or should it be strengthened?” 
Percentage distribution and mean score of responses of Greek MPs.  
 % Mean Score 











10 (unification should be strengthened) 23.3 
Note for tables hereafter: Evaluation is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 denotes an 
absolute view that “unification has gone too far” and 10 an absolute view that “unification 
should be strengthened”. 
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The parliamentarians of PASOK score the highest with regard to further 
promoting EU’s unification (mean score of 9.1). The MPs of ND follow 
with a mean score of 8.2 (Table 23). SYRIZA’s MPs have a mean score of 
5.6, which is slightly above the middle point of the scale. Among smaller 
parties, Democratic Left is, expectedly, the party mostly favouring the 
further unification of the EU, while Golden Dawn does so the least. The 
above results are statistically significant, as one-way ANOVA indicates 
[F(6, 66)=8.568, p=0.000)]. 
Table 23: “Has European unification gone too far or should it be strengthened?” 
Mean scores by party.  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Mean scores 7.0 8.2 5.6 9.1 6 1.8 8.3 6.7 
The relationship between opinions about further promoting European 
unification and left-right self-placement is also statistically significant at 
the 95 per cent confidence level [F(3, 69)=4.252, p=0.008)]. Table 24 
shows that MPs on the Centre favour the furthering of EU’s unification 
the most, with a mean score of 8.1, followed by MPs on the right (mean 
score 7.4).  
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Table 24: “Has European unification gone too far or should it be strengthened?” 
Mean scores by self-placement on the L-R scale*.  
 Total Left Centre Right No answer 
Mean scores 7.0 6.2 8.1 7.4 3 
Newcomers in parliament seem to be more reluctant than MPs with 
longer tenure in parliament to accept the further unification of the EU 
(Table 25). 
Table 25: “Has European unification gone too far or should it be strengthened?” 
Mean scores by party.  
 Total Newcomers Not newcomers 
Mean scores 7.0 6.5 7.7 
Agreement with the statement “the European Commission ought to 
become the true government of the European Union” is at 52.7 per cent 
amongst parliamentarians, while disagreement is at 47.3 per cent (Figure 
6). 
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Figure 6: “The European Commission ought to become the true government of the 
European Union” (%) 
 
The notion of the European Commission becoming the true government 
of the EU is supported by the absolute majority of parliamentarians who 
place themselves at the Centre of the Left-Right axis, with 77.3 per cent. 
Only 45.8 per cent of MPs on the Left and 44 per cent on the Right agree 
with this statement (Figure 7). This relationship is statistically significant 
[χ2 (3, N = 74) = 9.885, p = 0.002, Cramer’s V= 0.365]. 
Figure 7: “The European Commission ought to become the true government of the 
European Union” (%), by L-R self-placement 
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However, parliamentarians are not in favour of “a state-like democracy 
with a EU level government politically responsible to the European 
Parliament”, which they most likely perceive as a step further towards 
federalism. The percentage of parliamentarians who support such a 
development is 33.8 (Figure 8). The highest support of a state-like 
democracy for the EU is found among those parliamentarians who place 
themselves at the Centre of the ideological spectrum (54.5 per cent, 
Figure 9) and those who have governmental experience as members of 
cabinet (64.7 per cent, Figure 10).  
 
Figure 8: “Are you in favour of a state-like democracy with a EU level government 
politically responsible to the European Parliament?” (%) 
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Figure 9: “Are you in favour of a state-like democracy with a EU level government 
politically responsible to the European Parliament?”, by L-R self-placement (%) 
 
[χ2 (6, N = 74) = 15.613, p = 0.016, Cramer’s V= 0.325]  
Figure 10: “Are you in favour of a state-like democracy with a EU level government 
politically responsible to the European Parliament?”, by governmental experience 
(%) 
 
[χ2 (2, N = 74) = 9.509, p = 0.009, Cramer’s V= 0.358] 
What is the level (regional, national or European) of policy making which 
MPs consider most appropriate for policy formulation? According to our 
respondents, immigration (70.3 per cent), environmental policy (54.1 per 
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cent), banking and financial regulation (48.6 per cent) and unemployment 
(47.3 per cent) are the policy areas that should be dealt with at the 
European level. On the contrary, the provision of health care and fighting 
crime are policy areas better dealt with at the national level (48.7 per 
cent and 51.4 per cent respectively, Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Preferred level for the formulation of policies 
 
Further on, 79.7 per cent of parliamentarians either strongly or 
somewhat agree that “the member states ought to remain the central 
actors of the European Union”, meaning that Greek political elites choose 
the national level as their preferred level for the formulation of public 
policies (Table 26).  
MPs are split in half concerning the possibility that most important 
decisions concerning the EU are “taken by a majority of all European 
citizens via a European popular referendum”, with 52.7 per cent strongly 
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or somewhat agreeing with such a prospect and 45.9 per cent somewhat 
or strongly disagreeing (Table 27). 
Table 26: “The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European 
Union”. Percentage distribution of responses of Greek MPs. 
 % 
Strongly/somewhat agree 79.7 
Somewhat/strongly disagree 20.3 
Table 27: “Most important decisions concerning the EU should be taken by a 
majority of all European citizens via a European popular referendum”. Percentage 
distribution of responses of Greek MPs. 
 % 
Strongly/somewhat agree 52.7 
Somewhat/strongly disagree 45.9 
Don’t know/ No answer 1.4 
 
Regarding the formation of a single EU army, only 14.9 per cent agree 
with such a future development. On the other hand, 56.8 per cent of 
Greek parliamentarians prefer a combination of an EU and a national 
army and 24.3 per cent believe that there should only be a national army. 
Moreover, 4.3 per cent of the respondents believe that there should be 
neither a national nor a EU army (Table 28). 
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Table 28: “Some say that we should have a single European Union Army. Others say 
every country should keep its own national army. What is your opinion?” 
Percentage distribution of responses of Greek MPs. 
 % 
National Army 24.3 
European Union Army 14.9 
Both a National and EU Army 56.8 
Neither 4.1 
Finally, approval for common policies in taxation, social security, foreign 
affairs, aid to countries in need and the issuing of Eurobonds exceeds 73 
per cent in every case (not shown in a table). Approval ranges between 
73 per cent (in favour of a common EU tax system) and 99 per cent (in 
favour of help offered from the EU to regions of Member-States facing 
economic or social difficulties). 
5.5 The main dimensions of Greek political elite’s attitudes towards the 
EU 
Views about the EU, its institutions and its prospects are differentiated 
according to the party to which MPs belong. In order to determine 
whether there are some issue dimensions that could explain these 
differences, first, a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted, 
in order to identify the existence of latent variables or dimensions; and, 
second, discriminant analysis was conducted, using the components from 
the PCA as independent variables and the party that MPs belong to as 
dependent variable. Discriminant analysis determines the optimal 
combination of the independent variables (i.e. “functions”) and is helpful 
  34 
in giving meaning to the structure of competition and conflict between 
Greek MPs. 
Functions are interpreted in terms of standardized coefficients for each 
independent variable. The larger the standardized coefficient, the more 
the respective latent dimension contributes to the discrimination 
between political parties. Group centroids are also employed, in order to 
portray the relevant positions and distances between parties, across each 
function. Naturally, only statistically significant (p<0.05) components and 
functions are presented. 
Results 
Principal components analysis was performed on eight items regarding 
stances of Greek MPs towards several issues about the evaluation and 
the prospects of EU. The PCA returned two components that together 
explain almost 60 per cent of the total variance (Table 29). The first 
component comprises items capturing a Pro-European/Eurocritical 
dimension, while the second component is dominated by items that refer 
to a Federalism/Intergovernmentalism division. 
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The EU endangers the integrity of the Greek cultural 
system  
0.785  
Achievements of welfare system in Greece are 
endangered by the EU legislation  
0.780  
The EU endangers the quality of democracy in 
Greece  
0.747  
EU decisions endanger economic growth in Greece  0.737  
Most important decisions concerning the EU should 
be taken by a majority of all European citizens via a 
European popular referendum  
0.695  
The European Commission ought to become the true 
government of the European Union  
 0.875 
Some say that we should have a single European 
Union Army  
 0.611 
The member states ought to remain the central 
actors of the European Union  
 -0.523 
%  variance  37.9 21.8 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
The discriminant analysis produces two statistically significant functions, 
albeit one of them comprises almost 96.7 per cent of the total variance. 
In this dominant function (or dimension of conflict), the component with 
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the highest standardized coefficient is Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism 
(Table 29). It is interesting that when plotting the relevant position of 
parties across the dimension, an image of pro-bailout agreement/anti-
bailout agreement is revealed, with GD, SYRIZA and ANEL on the one end 
and DIMAR, PASOK and ND on the other. This means that the main 
dimension of conflict regarding European issues is pro/anti memorandum 
(MoU), which seems to give meaning to the Pro-
Europeanism/Eurocriticism dimension. In any case, due to the low 
number of cases, the results of the PCA and discriminant analysis 
depicted in Table 30 are considered only indicative. Further research may 
be necessary in order to confirm our results shown below. 
Table 30: Greek MPs Discriminant Analysis (N=69)* 
 
*Only the most powerful statistically significant (p<0.05) function is 
presented. The other statistically significant function is responsible for 
only 3.3 per cent of total variance and is dominated by the Federalism-
Intergovernmentalism factor, with a standardized canonical discriminant 
function coefficient of 0.75 and a structural coefficient of 0.94. The 
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relevant position of parties on the second function remotely resembles a 
Left-Right dimension. 
In order to further assess the predictive power of our two factors, i.e. 
Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism and Federalism-Intergovernmentalism, 
binary logistic regression was conducted, with the above factors as 
predictors and being a governmental or an opposition MP as the 
dependent variable. We had 70 valid cases in the model. A test of the full 
model against a constant-only model proved statistically significant, with 
the predictors reliably distinguishing between MPs of government and 
MPs of opposition (χ2=49.717, p<.000, df=2). The relationship between 
prediction and grouping was moderately strong, with Nagelkerke’s 
R2=.683 (Table 31).  
Table 31: Binary Logistic Regression of 70 MPs-Overall model evaluation. 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 49.717 2 .000 
 Block 49.717 2 .000 
 Model 49.717 2 .000 
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1 45,890a .508 .683 
aEstimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less 
than .001. 
*The H-L test’s results mean a good fit, since p>.005, however due to small sample size they 
must be considered indicative. 
According to the Wald criterion, both our factors are statistically 
significant, however Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticicm makes a much 
stronger contribution to the model, as expected. In sum, logistic 
regression results show that the less critical towards the EU and the more 
supportive of federalism an MP was, the most likely he or she would 
belong to a government party (Table 32). 
Table 32: Binary Logistic Regression of 70 MPs-Variables in the equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism -2.378 .581 16.771 1 .000 .093 
Federalism/Intergovernmentalism 1.190 .443 7.217 1 .007 3.287 
Constant -.097 .418 .054 1 .817 .908 
Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism, 
Federalism/Intergovernmentalism 
Overall prediction success of the model was 87.1 per cent (97.5 per cent 
for belonging to the government and 73.3 per cent for belonging to the 
opposition) (Table 33). In Figure 13 predicted probabilities of an MP 
belonging to a Government or opposition by positioning in the dominant 
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factor are plotted, demonstrating the linearity of the relationship. Wrong 
and correct predictions, as well as the overall fit of the model are 
demonstrated in Figure 14. 
Table 33: Binary Logistic Regression of 70 MPs-Classification table* 
Observed 
 Government Opposition 
Percentage 
Correct 
Government or Opposition 
party 
Government 39 1 97.5 
Opposition 8 22 73.3 
Overall percentage    87.1 
*The cut value is 0.500 
Figure 13: Probability of belonging to a Government or opposition party by 
Eurocriticism/Pro-Europeanism score (n=70). 
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Figure 14: Binary Logistic Regression of 70 MPs-Classification plot of predicted 
probability of belonging to a Government or opposition party. 
             Step number: 1
             Observed Groups and Predicted Probabilities
       8 +                                                                                                 O  +
         I                                                                                                 O  I
         I                                                                                                 O  I
F        I                                                                                                 O  I
R      6 +                                                                                                 O  +
E        I                                                                                                 O  I
Q        I   G   O  G     G                                                                                O  I
U        I   G   O  G     G                                                                                O  I
E      4 +   G   G  GG    G                                                                                O O+
N        I   G   G  GG    G                                                                                O OI
C        I   G G G  GG    G   G                  O                                                         O OI
Y        I   G G G  GG    G   G                  O                                                         O OI
       2 +   G G G  GG    G   G O   GG           O                                                   O O  OO O+
         I   G G G  GG    G   G O   GG           O                                                   O O  OO OI
         I   G G GG GGGO  GO  G G   GG    O      O  GG    G                                   O    O OOOO GOOOI
         I   G G GG GGGO  GO  G G   GG    O      O  GG    G                                   O    O OOOO GOOOI
Predicted ---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+----------
  Prob:   0       .1        .2        .3        .4        .5        .6        .7        .8        .9         1
  Group:  GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
          Predicted Probability is of Membership for Opposition
          The Cut Value is .50
          Symbols: G - Government
                   O - Opposition
          Each Symbol Represents .5 Cases.  
In sum, both discriminant analysis and logistic regression underlined the 
fact that issues concerning the EU today provide the structure of political 
competition amongst political elites. Moreover, SYRIZA and ANEL were 
close on the main conflict dimension, confirming our third hypothesis. 
The confirmation of our SYRIZA-ANEL proximity hypothesis is further 
solidified in the next section, where the combined worldview of SYRIZA 
and ANEL MPs is presented. 
6. The coalition government of SYRIZA-ANEL and the EU. 
Since our sample survey was conducted, parliamentary elections were 
held in Greece on 25 January 2015. As shown in Table 34, SYRIZA won the 
elections with 36.3 per cent, ND came second with 27.8 per cent and GD 
came third with 6.3 per cent. A newly-formed pro-European party, The 
River, which contested national elections for the first time, obtained 6.1 
per cent. Three more parties, namely KKE, ANEL and PASOK, passed the 
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three per cent electoral threshold and entered parliament. In brief, for 
the third consecutive time, seven parties in total entered the parliament.  
Table 34 Greece: January 2015 parliamentary elections results and allocation of 
parliamentary seats.  
 (%) Number of seats 
SYRIZA 36.3 149 
ND 27.8 76 
GD  6.3 17 
The River  6.1 17 
KKE  5.5 15 
ANEL  4.8 13 
PASOK  4.7 13 
Other  8.5 - 
Total 100 300 
Source: Greek Ministry of Interior 
(http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/index.html#{"cls":"main","params":{}}) 
No party held the absolute majority of 151 seats needed to form a 
government, but a coalition government of SYRIZA and ANEL was formed. 
This development vindicated the above presented discriminant analysis, 
were SYRIZA and ANEL were on the same side of the Pro-
Europeanism/Eurocriticism axis which was identified as the dominant 
dimension of conflict among political elites.  
On the basis of our research, we can construct the combined ‘worldview’ 
of today’s SYRIZA and ANEL (SYRIZA-ANEL) parliamentary majority toward 
the EU, even though the total number of MPs has changed after the 
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January 2015 elections, with SYRIZA obtaining 149 seats and ANEL 13 
seats, compared to 71 and 20 respectively, in the previous parliament.  
A general conclusion is that SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs, taken as a group, are 
systematically less pro-European and more skeptical towards EU 
institutions than the rest of MPs, concerning European identity, 
representation, scope of government and EU’s role during the crisis. 
SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs feel less attached to Europe and trust less the 
European Parliament and the European Commission (Tables 35 & 36). 
However, regarding the EP, the mean score of trust is above average, 5.6.  
Table 35: Attachment to Europe, percentage distribution of responses, SYRIZA-
ANEL/Others.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Very/somewhat 
attached 
77 68.2 80.8 
*Note for tables hereafter: MPs of all other parties. This categorization is done for 
presentation purposes, in order to show the views of MPs of the SYRIZA-ANEL government 
coalition. A full presentation of this variable by party is presented in Table 7. 
Table 36: Greek MPs: Level of trust in European Institutions. Mean scores by 
SYRIZA-ANEL/Others. 
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Trust in the European 
Parliament 
6.7 5.6 7.2 
Trust in the European 
Commission 
4.6 2.2 5.7 
* A full presentation of these variables by party can be found in Table 11. 
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All of SYRIZA-ANEL’s parliamentarians believe that Greece’s interests are 
not adequately represented at the decision-making centers of the EU 
(Table 37). At the same time, only 4.5 per cent of SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs are 
very or fairly satisfied by the way democracy works in the EU, a figure 
that is 50 per cent amongst the rest of parliamentarians (Table 38).  
Table 37: “Greece’s interests are not taken into account by those making decisions 
at the EU level”, 2014.  Percentage distribution of responses by SYRIZA-
ANEL/Others.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Strongly/somewhat agree 83.6 100 76.5 
Somewhat/strongly disagree 16.4 0 23.5 
*A full presentation of this variable can be found in Table 14. 
Table 38: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU by SYRIZA-
ANEL/Others. Percentage distribution of responses by party.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Very/Fairly satisfied 36.5 4.5 50 
Not very/Not at all satisfied 63.5 95.5 50 
*A full presentation of this variable can be found in Table 16. 
Moreover, 95.5 per cent of SYRIZA-ANEL MPs consider the EU as a threat 
to economic growth in Greece, as opposed to only 32.7 per cent of other 
parties’ MPs and 51.4 per cent in total (Table 39). Nevertheless, the 
  44 
absolute majority (54.5 per cent) of SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs agree with the 
notion that Greece has on balance benefited from its EU membership 
(Table 40), a view that is also shared by three quarters of Greek MPs, as 
already mentioned in section 5.3 (Figure 5).  
Regarding the prospects of further European unification, SYRIZA-ANEL’s 
MPs are rather skeptical. Their mean score on the eleven-point scale 
about the need for strengthening the unification process is 5.7, being 
significantly less than the 7.6 score amongst the rest of parliamentarians 
(Table 41). Furthermore, compared with the rest of MPs, the MPs of 
SYRIZA-ANEL are less in favour of the enhancement, in the next decade, 
of common taxation, social security system and foreign policy (Table 42). 
However, even amongst SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs positive evaluations of 
common policies comprise the absolute majority. 
Table 39: The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, by SYRIZA-ANEL/Others. 
Percentage distribution of responses.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Strongly/Somewhat Agree 51.4 95.5 32.7 
Somewhat/Strongly Disagree  48.6 4.5 67.3 
*A full presentation of this variable by party can be found in Table 18. 
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Table 40: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Greece has on 
balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” percentage 
distribution of responses by SYRIZA-ANEL/Others 
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Has benefited 77.0 54.5 86.5 
Has not benefited 17.6 40.9 7.7 
DK/NA 5.4 4.5 5.8 
*A full presentation of this variable can be found in Figure 5. 
Table 41: “Has European unification gone too far or should it be strengthened?” 
Mean scores by SYRIZA-ANEL/Others.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Mean scores 7.0 5.7 7.6 
* A full presentation of these variable by party can be found in Table 23. 
Table 42: The evolution of the EU over the next ten years: results of the 2014 
survey. Percentage distribution of responses in favour of specific common policies, 
by SYRIZA-ANEL/Others.  
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others 
Common tax system 73 54.5 80.8 
Common social security system 81.1 68.2 86.5 
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Common foreign policy 74.3 54.5 82.7 
Help for EU regions in economic or 
social difficulties 
98.6 100 98.1 
Issuing of Eurobonds 87.8 81.8 90.4 
Note: In favor comprises “approve” and “rather approve” of a certain policy. 
Finally, a finding that can be considered as a harbinger of the SYRIZA-
ANEL coalition government is that the MPs of these two parties evaluate 
very negatively the handling of the crisis by EU’s institutions. On an 
eleven-point scale (0.0-10.0), were 0.0 means an absolutely negative 
evaluation, they evaluate the European Commission with a mean score of 
1.7, the European Council with a mean score of 2.0 and the ECB with a 
very low 1.1 (Table 43). 
Table 43: Evaluation of European institutions’ role during the crisis. Mean scores by 
SYRIZA-ANEL/Others. 
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
European Commission 4.1 1.7 5.1 
European Council 4.5 2 5.5 
European Central Bank 4.1 1.1 5.4 
A full presentation of these variables by party can be found in Table 28. 
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In sum, SYRIZA and ANEL’s MPs views during the previous parliamentary 
term (June 2012-December 2014) confirm our claim that the dominant 
division amongst Greek political elites has to do with stances towards the 
EU. The two parties’ MPs share a critical view of EU institutions in general 
and their role in the handling of the crisis in particular, while they are not 
as enthusiastic about the prospects of European integration as are their 
colleagues from most other parties. The above findings underline the fact 
that there was indeed common ground for the seemingly incongruous, in 
‘classic’ left-right terms, coalition government between SYRIZA and ANEL 
that was formed after the January 2015 parliamentary elections. 
7. Conclusions and further analysis 
The views of MPs on the issue of European identity seem to follow pre-
crisis patterns, while the two other main subjects discussed in this paper, 
namely representation and scope of governance, confirm the hypothesis 
about a rupture in the continuity of MPs’ perceptions. The latter is most 
certainly owed to the rather negative evaluations of EU institutions’ role 
during the economic crisis. Our second hypothesis was also verified since 
a) governmental MPs, b) MPs self-placed at the centre of the left-right 
spectrum and c) more experienced MPs tended to have more pro-
European views and attitudes than the rest of MPs (members of the 
opposition, far-right and left MPs and newcomers in parliament). 
More specifically, European identity, measured as the extent of 
attachment to Europe, was stronger in 2014 than in 2007, with more than 
three out of four MPs stating that they were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ 
attached to it. This was the case even with SYRIZA’s MPs, the only 
exception being MPs of ANEL and GD, amongst whom attachment to 
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Europe was low. As far as representation is concerned, compared to 2007 
(the year a comparable survey of MPs had been conducted), trust both in 
the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC) was 
less in 2014, the decline being greater in the case of EC. Governmental 
MPs and MPs self-placed at the centre and the right of the left-right scale 
showed more trust in the EP and the EC.  
An impressive change, compared to 2007, has occurred regarding views 
on representation of Greece’s interests. In 2014 a vast majority (more 
than 8 out of 10) of Greek MPs agree with the view that Greek interests 
are not taken into account in EU’s decision-making centres. In 2007 less 
than 3 out of 10 MPs agreed with this view.  Accordingly, only one out of 
three MPs is satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU, with ND’s 
and PASOK’s MPs being the most satisfied.  
On the issue concerning whether EU poses a threat to several relevant 
aspects of Greece’s economy and society, namely the welfare system, 
quality of democracy, culture and economic growth, the absolute 
majority of MPs agree that EU endangers only economic growth. Only a 
minority of MPs, who mostly belonged to the then opposition parties, 
considered that the rest of aforementioned aspects of Greek economy 
and society were threatened by the EU. 
Given the fact that 77 per cent of MPs believe that EU membership has in 
general been beneficiall for Greece, the perception of EU as a threat to 
economic growth in Greece has to be linked with the relatively poor 
evaluation of the role of EU’s institutions in handling the economic crisis. 
MPs evaluated lowly the role of the EC and the role of the European 
Central Bank in the scale 0.0-10.00. The mean score was 4.1 for the EC 
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and 4.5 for the European Council. MPs belonging to ND evaluated 
positively all three institutions and MPs belonging to PASOK evaluated 
negatively only the EC.  
The process of furthering EU’s unification finds support among all parties’ 
MPs (mean score: 7.0), with the exception of GD.  There are some policy 
areas, like immigration, environmental protection, banking and 
unemployment, which are considered by the majority of MPs as most 
suitable to be handled at the European level, as opposed to health care 
and fighting crime, which are considered primarily domestic issues.  
In order to assess what are the main dimensions, along which the 
opinions of Greek MPs are differentiated, we conducted principal 
components analysis, which revealed two latent issue dimensions: pro-
Europeanism/Eurocriticism and Federalism/Intergovernmentalism. The 
former component proved to dominate the main statistically significant 
function produced by a discriminant analysis which was conducted as a 
next step. The plotting of political parties across the issue dimension of 
pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism revealed an arrangement of pro-bailout 
agreement parties on the one end and anti-bailout agreement parties on 
the other end of the dimension. This means that the dominant dimension 
of conflict for Greek political elites is the issue of the MoUs.  Moreover, a 
binary logistic regression confirmed the fact that the above factors are 
good predictors of whether an MP belongs to a governmental or 
opposition party (up to the parliamentary elections of 25 January 2015).  
At the same time, both discriminant analysis and logistic regression’s 
results of our survey of MPs of the previous parliament (2012-2014) 
verify the hypothesis that the SYRIZA-ANEL government that was formed 
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after the January 2015 elections was not a surprise given the close 
proximity of these two parties on the aforementioned dominant 
dimension of conflict for Greek political elites, namely their stance 
towards the MoUs in particular and towards the EU in general. Especially 
concerning the views and attitudes of SYRIZA-ANEL MPs, it was 
demonstrated in a separate section (section 6) that they were 
consistently more critical towards the EU, compared to the total of MPs. 
In sum, our findings show that the fiscal and financial crisis has not 
altered the European identity of Greek MPs but has negatively influenced 
their perceptions about representation in the EU, the process of 
European integration, as well as their evaluation of how the EU 
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